Publication
Managerial overconfidence and pay-for-luck
Wei, X.A., 2025. Managerial overconfidence and pay-for-luck. International Review of Financial Analysis, p.104607.
This research presented on 2025 Southern Finance Association Annual Conference (Orlando, Florida, US), 2025 Financial Management Association (FMA) Annual Conference (Vancouver, Canada). Thanks all anonymous reviewers and participants for valuable comments and insights.
“It is not compensation that is in the interest of shareholders in any way” (Andreani et al., 2024)
Abstract: This paper examines how CEO overconfidence amplifies the “pay-for-luck” phenomenon in executive compensation. Using a decomposition of firm performance into exogenous “luck” and firm-specific “skill” components, we find that overconfident CEOs receive disproportionately higher rewards for positive market shocks while avoiding equivalent penalties for negative shocks. To address endogeneity concerns, we instrument CEO overconfidence using the industry-level density of overconfident CEOs and Lewbel’s (2012) internal IV approach. Our results remain robust across alternative overconfidence measures, empirical specifications, and governance conditions. Further analysis suggests that overconfident CEOs engage in greater risk-taking behaviors and higher R&D investments which reinforce the effects of CEO overconfidence on pay-for-luck. Additionally, we find that stronger corporate governance and DoDD-Frank Act mitigates the extent of overconfident CEOs’ pay-for-luck. These findings contribute to the literature on executive compensation and behavioral corporate finance, offering implications for incentive design and governance reforms.
Working paper
IPO Survival and Managerial Confidence
with Dr. Ufuk Güçbilmez
This research presented on 2023 BAFA Scotland Doctoral Conference (Edinburgh, Scotland UK, ); 2024 annual conference of the Scotish Economic Society (SES) (Glasgow, Scotland, UK); 2024 European Accounting Association (EAA) annual meeting (Bucharest, Romania); 2024 European Financial Management Association (EFMA) annual meeting (Lisbon, Portugal); 2024 Finance and Business Analytics (FBA) Meeting (Athens, Greece), 2025 Financial Management Association (FMA Europe) Europe Annual Meeting (Limassol, Cyprus), 2025 World Finance Conference (Malta), 2025 Financial Management Association (FMA) Annual Conference (Vancouver, Canada). Thanks all anonymous reviewers and participants for valuable comments and insights.
Abstract: This study empirically examines the hypothesis of whether, how, and why CEO overconfidence substantially influences the Initial Public Offerings (IPO) failure risk. We construct CEO overconfidence measurement through a textual analysis by extracting optimistic sentiments within the entirety of the S-1 form and specifically the management discussion section, finding that overconfident CEOs correlate with a roughly 27% reduction in the probability of IPO failure. Our findings remain robust through various tests, and we use the internal instrumental-variable (IV) method to identify the causal effect of CEO overconfidence on IPO survival. We also use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as an exogenous shock to identify the causal effect of CEO overconfidence on IPO survival, the study finds that the inverse relationship between CEO overconfidence and IPO failure is more pronounced on post-implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Additionally, our research illuminates that R&D investment acts as a moderating factor amplifying the positive impact of CEO overconfidence on IPO survival.
Determinants of Organization Capital: Does CEO matters?
with Dr. Ufuk Güçbilmez and Dr. Yang Bo
This research presented on 2025 BAFA Annual Conference (Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK); 2025 Asian Finance Association Annual Meeting (Taipei City, Taiwan). Thanks all anonymous reviewers and participants for valuable comments and insights.
Abstract: This study empirically examines the determinants of organizational capital, with a particular focus on the impact of CEO turnover. We find that the appointment of a new CEO significantly stimulates the accumulation of organizational capital, increasing its stock by approximately 15%. Furthermore, a one standard deviation increase in managerial ability corresponds to an estimated 7%-8% increase in the standard deviation of organizational capital. Our findings suggest that the primary mechanisms driving this effect are the CEO’s ability and compensation level. Specifically, while a new CEO typically enhances organizational capital, highly capable CEOs markedly accelerate its accumulation in the post-turnover period. Conversely, less capable CEOs devote less attention to organizational capital accumulation following their appointment. Our results remain robust across subsamples that account for various reasons behind CEO dismissals, including voluntary, involuntary, and forced turnover, thereby supporting causal inference. Additionally, we observe that the CEO compensation structure—including performance-based pay and the CEO pay gap—moderates and amplifies the positive effect of CEO ability on organizational capital. Finally, the presence of outside CEOs and highly capable CEOs further strengthens the positive effects of CEO turnover on organizational capital.
Government Agency Exposure and Corporate Competition
with Dr. Rongxin Chen and Dr. Yujia Chang
Abstract: This study empirically examines how firm-level exposure to government agencies affects corporate competition. Using text-based measures of agency exposure, product-market fluidity, product similarity, and a text-based Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), we find that a one–standard-deviation increase in agency exposure raises competition by 5%–9%. These results remain robust when we replace the text-based HHI with the traditional HHI. Further analysis identifies several channels through which agency exposure influences competition. Specifically, higher regulatory costs and higher market liquidity attenuate the effect, whereas greater investment levels and lower effective tax rates amplify it. To establish causality, we exploit three exogenous shocks: the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), Internal Revenue Service (IRS) enforcement cycles, and the unexpected victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Consistent with the hypothesis, SOX increased regulatory burden and reduced competition, whereas the IRS and Trump shocks weakened regulatory power and increased competition. Additionally, we find regulatory fragmentation increase the competition but regulatory fragmentation and exposure to government agencies seems have a reversal effects on competition. Finally, we employ Lewbel’s (2012) heteroskedasticity-based IV estimator to corroborate the causal interpretation.
Non Neutrality of Macroprudential Policies
with Dr. Shuren Shi and Dr. Yujia Chang
Abstract: This paper examines the causal effects of macroprudential policies (MaPs) on credit constraints faced by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), considering both bank and non-bank financing channels. Using firm-level survey data, we show that tighter MaPs significantly worsen SMEs’ access to bank finance. Specifically, macroprudential tightening leads to higher borrowing costs, shorter maturities, and smaller credit volumes. These effects are driven primarily by bank credit lines, while traditional bank loans remain largely insensitive to MaPs. Moreover, micro and small firms are more adversely affected than medium-sized firms, consistent with a flight-to-quality effect in bank lending. The impact of MaPs is also stronger for capital-intensive SMEs, indicating that asset-based lending constitutes an important transmission channel. Beyond bank finance, we find that tighter MaPs exacerbate credit constraints in trade credit markets, suggesting that regulatory tightening propagates along supply chains rather than being fully offset by non-bank finance. However, this adverse effect is weaker for firms with access to a broader set of alternative capital market financing options. Finally, we document significant inward spillovers from foreign macroprudential policies: tighter MaPs abroad alleviate domestic SMEs’ credit constraints, partly by reducing interest rate pressures. Overall, the results highlight important trade-offs between financial stability objectives and SMEs’ access to external finance, as well as the role of cross-border spillovers in shaping firm-level credit conditions.
The Price of Dissent: Financial Market Responses to Anti-U.S. Votes in the UN Security Council
with Dr. Shuren Shi
Abstract: This paper quantifies the financial cost of geopolitical disagreement with the U.S., we implement an event-study of UNSC resolutions from 1973-2022 in which at least one member voted against the U.S. position and measure contemporaneous market responses. Relative to Advanced Economies, Emerging Market Economies that cast such a vote experience negative reactions: we document significant declines in equity returns, surges in abnormal trading volume, and a widening of sovereign bond spreads. The market penalty is substantially weaker for countries with stronger prior foreign-policy alignment with the United States, consistent with a stock of “relational capital” that buffers perceived retaliation risk.
The Double-Edged Role of Organizational Capital in Cash Flow Volatility
with Dr. Shuren Shi, Dr. Yujia Chang, and Prof. Zhong Wang
Abstract: This paper examines the effects of organizational capital on cash flow volatility. We find a positive relationship between organizational capital and cash flow volatility, with an estimated effect size of 7.6\%. The results remain robust when using alternative measures of both cash flow volatility and organizational capital. We show that both positive and negative cash flow volatility are influenced by higher levels of organizational capital. We argue that organizational capital is a double-edged sword: it provides benefits but also increases risk. In particular, we find that it is strongly associated with downside cash flow volatility. To address endogeneity, we employ several approaches, including instrumental variable (IV) estimation, Lewbel’s (2012) internal IV method, entropy balancing, and propensity score matching (PSM). The results remain consistent across all specifications. Furthermore, the effect is more pronounced in firms with weaker governance, lower managerial ability, more aggressive tax behavior, and during periods of heightened market uncertainty.
Legal Protection, Talent Mobility, and the Crash Risk of Organizational Capital
with Dr. Kun Duan, Dr. Shuren Shi and Dr. Yujia Chang
Abstract: This paper examines the relation between organizational capital and future stock price crash risk. Using a panel of U.S. firms from 1992 to 2024. We find a positive relation between organizational capital and next-year crash risk. A one standard deviation increase in organizational capital raises the stock price crash risk by about 30\% of its sample mean. The results are robust to alternative measures and specifications. To address endogeneity, we use state-level unemployment insurance generosity as an instrument for organizational capital and obtain consistent positive second-stage estimates. Cross-sectional tests show that the effect is stronger in states recognizing the inevitable disclosure doctrine, in firms with higher employee turnover, and when CEOs have higher general ability, but not higher firm-specific ability. Overall, the results indicate that talent-embedded organizational capital increases downside tail risk, and that labor market and legal institutions shape this risk.
Work-in-Progress
Banking topics
with Dr. Shengfeng (Frank) Mei and Dr. Shure Shi
CEO personal behaviour topics
with Dr. Conghui (Jocelyn) Chen and Dr. Rongxin Chen
Macroprudential Policies topics
with Dr. Shuren Shi
CEO compensation topics
with Dr. Yujia Chang
CEO tenure topics
with Dr. Jinghan Guan, Prof. Alaa Zalata, and Dr. shakeel Ahmed
Chinese policy topics
with Dr. Chen Yang
Machine Learning, deep learning, and marco-ecnomics forcasting topics
with Dr. Yujia Chang, Prof. Tapas Mishra and Prof. Mario Brito